The SPD is headed by a Director General from the Army and acts as the secretariat for the NCA.

The SPD's functions include formulating Islamabad's nuclear policy, strategy, and doctrine;
developing the nuclear chain of command; and formulating operational plans at the service level
for the movement, deployment, and use of nuclear weapons. The Army, Air Force, and Navy each have their own strategic force command, but operational planning and control remains with the NCA. The SPD coordinates operational plans with the strategic forces commands. According to current and former Pakistani officials, Islamabad employs a system which requires that at least

two, and perhaps three, people authenticate launch codes for nuclear weapons. 47
On December 13, 2007, then-President Musharraf formalized these authorities and structure in
the "National Command Authority Ordinance, 2007."48 The NCA was established by
administrative order, but now has a legal basis. Analysts point out that the timing of this
ordinance was meant to help the command and control system weather political transitions and

potentially preserve the military's strong control over the system. The ordinance also addresses
the problems of the proliferation of nuclear expertise and personnel reliability. It outlines
punishable offenses related to breach of confidentiality or leakage of "secured information," gives the SPD authority to investigate suspicious conduct, states that punishment for these offenses can be up to 25 years imprisonment, and applies to both serving and retired personnel, including military personnel, notwithstanding any other laws.

As a result, Pakistani authorities say that the ordinance should strengthen their control over strategic organizations and their personnel.
Security Concerns
According to a 2001 Department of Defense report, Islamabad's nuclear weapons "are probably
stored in component form,"49 which suggests that the nuclear warheads are stored separately from delivery vehicles. According to some reports, the fissile cores of the weapons are separated from the non-nuclear explosives.50 But whether this is actually the case is unclear; one report states that the warheads and delivery vehicles are probably stored separately in facilities close to one another, but says nothing about the fissile cores.51 And, according to an account of a 2008 experts' group visit to Pakistan, Lt.

Gen. Khalid Kidwai, the head of the SPD, suggested that the nuclear warheads (containing the fissile cores) may be mated with their delivery vehicles.52 According to Kidwai, the report says, the SPD's official position is that the weapons "will be ready when required, at the shortest notice; [but] the Pakistani doctrine is not endorsing a US-USSR model with weapons on hair trigger alert." The 2001 Defense Department report says that Pakistan can probably assemble its weapons fairly quickly.53

It warrants mention that, although separate storage may provide a layer of protection against
accidental launch or prevent theft of an assembled weapon, it may be easier for unauthorized
people to remove a weapon's fissile material core if it is not assembled. Dispersal of the assets
may also create more potential access points for acquisition and may increase the risk of

diversion.54
As the United States prepared to launch an attack on the Afghan Taliban after September 11,
2001, President Musharraf reportedly ordered that Pakistan's nuclear arsenal be redeployed to "at least six secret new locations."55 This action came at a time of uncertainly about the future of the region, including the direction of U.S.-Pakistan relations. Islamabad's leadership was uncertain whether the United States would decide to conduct military strikes against Pakistan's nuclear assets if the government did not assist the United States against the Taliban. Indeed, President Musharraf cited protection of Pakistan's nuclear and missile assets as one of the reasons for Islamabad's dramatic policy shift.56

These events, in combination with the 1999 Kargil crisis, the 2002 conflict with India at the Line
of Control, and revelations about the A.Q. Khan proliferation network, inspired a variety of
reforms to secure the nuclear complex. Risk of nuclear war in South Asia ran high in the 1999
Kargil crisis, when the Pakistani military is believed to have begun preparing nuclear-tipped

missiles.57It should be noted that, even at the high alert levels of 2001 and 2002, there were no
reports of Pakistan mating the warheads with delivery systems.58
In the fall of 2007 and early 2008, some observers expressed concern about the security of the
country's arsenal if political instability were to persist.59Former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto
said in a November 5, 2007, interview that, although then-President Musharraf claimed to be in

firm control of the nuclear arsenal, she feared this control could weaken due to instability in the
country.60Similarly, Michael Krepon of the Henry L. Stimson Center has argued that "a
prolonged period of turbulence and infighting among the country's President, Prime Minister, and Army Chief" could jeopardize the army's unity of command, which "is essential for nuclear

security."61During that time, U.S. military officials also expressed concern about the security of
Pakistan's nuclear weapons.62 Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA), Mohamed ElBaradei, also has expressed fears that a radical regime could take power in
Pakistan, and thereby acquire nuclear weapons.63 Experts also worry that while nuclear weapons

are currently under firm control, with warheads disassembled, technology could be sold off by
insiders during a worsened crisis.64
However, U.S. intelligence officials have expressed greater confidence regarding the security of
Islamabad's nuclear weapons. Deputy Secretary of State John D. Negroponte in testimony to
Congress on November 7, 2007 said he believed that there is "plenty of succession planning that's going on in the Pakistani military" and that Pakistan's nuclear weapons are under "effective technical control."65 Similarly, Donald Kerr, Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence, told a Washington audience May 29, 2008, that the Pakistani military's control of the nuclear weapons is "a good thing because that's an institution in Pakistan that has, in fact, withstood many of the political changes over the years." A Department of Defense spokesperson told reporters December 9, 2008, that Washington has "no reason at this point to have any concern with regards to the security" of Islamabad's nuclear arsenal.

More recently, Maples stated March 10, 2009, that Islamabad "has taken important steps to safeguard its nuclear weapons," although he pointed out that "vulnerabilities exist."
Other governments have also voiced opinions regarding the security of Pakistan's nuclear arsenal.
For example, Indian National Security Adviser M. K. Narayanan said that the arsenal is safe and

has adequate checks and balances.66Similarly, Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth
Affairs David Miliband told the Charlie Rose Show December 15, 2008, that Islamabad's nuclear weapons "are under pretty close lock and key." Russian Deputy Prime Minister Sergei Ivanov,
however, sounded somewhat less optimistic in a March 24, 2009, television interview, stating that Moscow is "very much concerned" about the security of Pakistan's arsenal.67

Pakistani officials have consistently expressed confidence in the security of the country's nuclear
arsenal. Then-President Musharraf stated in November 2007 that Pakistan's nuclear weapons are
under "total custodial controls."68 More recently, President Asif Ali Zardari told CNN December
2, 2008, that the country's nuclear command and control system "is working well." Additionally,

a Pakistani Foreign Ministry spokesperson stated May 21, 2009, that "there is simply no question
of our strategic assets falling into the wrong hands. We have full confidence in our procedures,
mechanisms and command and control systems."
In addition to the above scenarios, the security of Pakistan's nuclear weapons could also be
jeopardized by another conflict between India and Pakistan, Michael Krepon argued, explaining

that an "escalating war with nuclear forces in the field would increase the probability of
accidents, miscalculations, and the use of nuclear weapons." This is because
[w]hen tensions rise precipitously with India, the readiness level of Pakistan's nuclear
deterrent also rises. Because the geographical coordinates of Pakistan's main nuclear weapon
storage sites, missile, and air bases can be readily identified from satellites-and therefore

targeted by opposing forces-the dictates of deterrence mandate some movement of
launchers and weapons from fixed locations during crises. Nuclear weapons on the move are
inherently less secure than nuclear weapons at heavily-guarded storage sites. Weapons and
launchers in motion are also more susceptible to "insider" threats and accidents.69
Such a war, Krepon added, would also place stress on the army's unity of command. Krepon has

also pointed out that Islamabad faces a dilemma, because less-dispersed nuclear weapons may be
more vulnerable to a disarming military strike from India.70
U.S. Assistance and Pakistani Nuclear Security
U.S. plans to secure Pakistani nuclear weapons in case of a loss of control by the Pakistani
government were famously addressed during Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice's confirmation

hearing in January 2005. In response to a question from Senator John Kerry asking what would
happen to Pakistan's nuclear weapons in the event of a radical Islamic coup in Islamabad,
Secretary Rice answered, "We have noted this problem, and we are prepared to try to deal with
it."71 On November 12, 2007, responding to press reports about this contingency, a Pakistan

Foreign Office spokesperson said, "Pakistan possesses adequate retaliatory capacity to defend its
strategic assets and sovereignty," emphasizing that Islamabad's nuclear weapons have been under "strong multi-layered, institutionalized decision-making, organizational, administrative and command and control structures since 1998."72The issue of U.S. contingency plans to take over Pakistani strategic assets was raised again in the press following Benazir Bhutto's assassination, and was met with similar assurances by Pakistan's government.73

More recently, a Pakistan Foreign Office spokesperson, responding to a report detailing alleged
U.S.-Pakistani discussions regarding contingency plans for U.S. forces to help secure Islamabad's nuclear weapons, stated November 8, 2009, that Pakistan "does not require any foreign assistance in this regard." Pakistan will never "allow any country to have direct or indirect access to its nuclear and strategic facilities," the spokesperson said, adding that "no talks have ever taken place on the issue of the security of Pakistan's nuclear arsenal with US officials."74 U.S.

Ambassador to Pakistan Anne Patterson stated the same day that the United States "has no
intention to seize Pakistani nuclear weapons or material."
The United States reportedly offered Pakistan nuclear security assistance soon after September
11, 2001.75 U.S. assistance to Islamabad, which must comply with nonproliferation guidelines,
has reportedly included the sharing of best practices and technical measures to prevent

unauthorized or accidental use of nuclear weapons, as well as contribute to physical security of
storage facilities and personnel reliability.76 Some press reports say that the United States
provided Pakistan with Permissive Action Links (PALs) in 2003, although former Pakistani
military officials have said Pakistan has developed PALs for its warheads without assistance.77

PALs require a code to be entered before a weapon can be detonated. As noted above, Islamabad
employs a system requiring that at least two, and perhaps three, people authenticate launch codes
for nuclear weapons.78 Security at nuclear sites in Islamabad is the responsibility of a 10,000-
member security force, commanded by a two-star general.
Former Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage confirmed in a November 2007 interview

that there has been U.S. assistance in this area, explaining that the United States was unlikely to
intervene militarily in a crisis in Pakistan because "we have spent considerable time with the
Pakistani military, talking with them and working with them on the security of their nuclear
weapons. I think most observers would say that they are fairly secure. They have pretty

sophisticated mechanisms to guard the security of those."79 Rolf Mowatt-Larssen, former Director
of the Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence at the U.S. Department of Energy, pointed
out in May 2009 that "there's not a lot of transparency into" how Islamabad spends the U.S.
funds, but he nevertheless characterized them as "money well spent."80 A Pakistani official said in November 2009 that Pakistan reserves the right to "pick and choose" the nuclear security

measures it will undertake, adding that Islamabad will only accept such measures that are "nonintrusive."81
The extent to which Pakistan has shared information about its nuclear arsenal with the United
States is unclear. Although, as noted, former President Musharraf has acknowledged Islamabad's
sharing of some information, General Tariq Majid, Chair of Pakistan's Joint Chiefs of Staff

Committee, stated November 9, 2009, that "there is absolutely no question of sharing or allowing
any foreign individual, entity or a state, any access to sensitive information about our nuclear
assets."82
The U.S. government has also reportedly offered assistance to secure or destroy radioactive
materials that could be used to make a radioactive dispersal device, and to ship highly enriched

uranium used in the Pakistani civilian nuclear sector out of the country.83 Pakistan's response to
these proposals is unclear.
It is worth noting that, according to some observers, spent fuel from Pakistan's Karachi and
Chasma nuclear power plants could be vulnerable to theft or attack.84 Pakistani officials have
expressed confidence in the security of its facilities, however.85

US and Western Concerns over Proliferation
Many observers are concerned that other states or terrorist organizations could obtain material or
expertise related to nuclear weapons from Pakistan.86 Beginning in the 1970s, Pakistan used
clandestine procurement networks to develop its nuclear weapons program. Former Pakistani
nuclear official A.Q. Khan subsequently used a similar network to supply Libya, North Korea,

and Iran with materials related to uranium enrichment.87
Al-Qaeda has also sought assistance from the Khan network. According to former Director of
Central Intelligence George Tenet, the United States "received fragmentary information from an
intelligence service" that in 1998 Osama bin Laden had "sent emissaries to establish contact"
with the network.88 Other Pakistani sources could also provide nuclear material to terrorist

organizations. According to a 2005 report by the Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of
the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction, al-Qaeda "had established contact
with Pakistani scientists who discussed development of nuclear devices that would require hardto-obtain materials like uranium to create a nuclear explosion."89 Tenet explains that these

scientists were affiliated with a different organization than the Khan network.
The current status of Pakistan's nuclear export network is unclear, although most official U.S.
reports indicate that, at the least, it has been damaged considerably. Director of National
Intelligence John D. Negroponte implied that the network had been dismantled when he asserted

in a January 11, 2007, statement to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence that "Pakistan
had been a major source of nuclear proliferation until the disruption of the A.Q. Khan network."90
More recently, a January 12, 2009, State Department press release said that the network "is no
longer operating." For its part, Pakistan's Foreign Office stated February 7, 2009, that Pakistan

"has dismantled the nuclear black market network." Asked during a July 20, 2009, interview
whether North Korea was transferring "nuclear weapons" or related advice to North Korea,
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton replied that there is "no evidence" that Pakistan is doing so.
However, when asked about the network's current status during a July 25, 2007, Senate Foreign

Relations Committee hearing, Undersecretary for Political Affairs Nicholas Burns replied that:
I cannot assert that no part of that network exists, but it's my understanding based on our
conversations with the Pakistanis that the network has been fundamentally dismantled. But
to say that there are no elements in Pakistan, I'm not sure I could say that.
Similarly, the London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies found in a May 2007

report that "at least some of Khan's associates appear to have escaped law enforcement attention
and could ... resume their black-market business."91
Asked about Pakistan's cooperation in investigating the network, Burns acknowledged that the
United States has not had "personal, consistent access" to Khan, but added that he did not "have
all the details of everything we've done." Similarly, the IAEA has not yet been able to interview

Khan directly, according to an agency official. However, Islamabad has responded to written
questions from the IAEA and has been cooperative with the agency's investigation of Iran's
nuclear program.92 Khan himself told Dawn News TV May 29, 2008, that he would not cooperate with U.S. or IAEA investigators. If you are you looking for more information in regards to m88 look at our web site. A Pakistani Foreign Office spokesperson told reporters in May 2006 that the government considered the Khan investigation "closed"-a position an Office spokesperson reiterated February 6, 2009.

The State Department announced January 12, 2009, that it was imposing sanctions on 13
individuals and three companies for their involvement in the Khan network. The sanctions were
imposed under the Export-Import Bank Act, the Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act, and
Executive Orders 12938 and 13382.
Pakistan's Response over US and Western Concerns
Undersecretary Burns testified in July 2007 that the Bush administration has "told the Pakistani

government that it is its responsibility ... to make sure" that neither the Khan network nor a
"similar organization" resurfaces in the country. Since the revelations about the Khan network,
Pakistan appears to have increased its efforts to prevent nuclear proliferation. But whether and to
what extent these efforts have been successful is not yet clear. It is worth noting that, because

Khan conducted his proliferation activities as a government official, they do not necessarily
indicate a failure of Islamabad's export controls.
Pakistani officials argue that Islamabad has taken a number of steps to prevent further
proliferation of nuclear-related technologies and materials.93 For example, Islamabad adopted in
September 2004 new national export controls legislation which includes a requirement that the

government issue control lists for "goods, technologies, material, and equipment which may
contribute to designing, development, stockpiling, [and] use" of nuclear weapons and related
delivery systems. According to a February 2008 presentation by Zafar Ali, Director of Pakistan's
Strategic Export Controls Division (SECDIV),94 the lists, which were issued in October 2005 and are to be periodically updated, include items controlled by multilateral export control regimes, such as the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Australia Group, and the Missile Technology Control Regime.95 The export controls legislation also includes a catch-all clause, which requires exporters to notify the government if they are aware or suspect that goods or technology are intended by the end-user for use in nuclear or biological weapons, or missiles capable of

delivering such weapons.96
The legislation includes several other important elements, such as end-use and end-user
certification requirements and new penalties for violators. Since its adoption, Pakistan has
established the SECDIV and an associated Oversight Board. The SECDIV is responsible for
formulating rules and regulations for implementing the legislation. The board is comprised of

officials from multiple agencies and is headed by Pakistan's Foreign Secretary.
Islamabad says that it has also taken several other steps to improve its nuclear security. For
example, the government announced in June 2007 that it is "implementing a National Security
Action Plan with the [IAEA's] assistance." That same month, Pakistan also joined the U.S.- and

Russian-led Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism. As noted above, the December 2007
National Command Authority Ordinance also includes measures to prevent the spread of nuclearrelated materials and expertise.
Pakistani officials participating in an April 2007 Partnership for Global Security workshop argued that Islamabad has improved the reliability of its nuclear personnel by, for example, making security clearance procedures more stringent. However, the officials also acknowledged that Islamabad still needs to do more to control its nuclear expertise.97 Similarly, Admiral Mullen stated May 14, 2009, that the country's personnel reliability system must "continue to improve."

The United States has also provided export control assistance to Pakistan. Burns described several such efforts in his July 2007 testimony.98 And according to an October 2007 U.S. Government Accountability Office report, Islamabad was during FY2003-FY2006 the second-largest recipient of bilateral U.S.
assistance designed to improve target countries' export controls. Pakistan received such assistance from the Departments of State, Energy, and Homeland Security.99

Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security-Designate Ellen Tauscher
told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that the Obama administration does not support
conditioning aid to Pakistan on permitting direct U.S. access to Khan, arguing, in part, that the
United States has "obtained a great deal of information about the Khan network without having

direct access to A.Q. Khan."100
According The BBC News,Wednesday, 23 January 2008, Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf has dismissed fears that his country's nuclear weapons could be acquired by Islamist militants.
A report last year recommended that the US send in special forces to help "secure the Pakistani nuclear arsenal".
Pakistan's foreign office dismissed the report as "outlandish musings", insisting there was no danger of the country's strategic assets falling into the wrong hands.

At the moment, few believe Islamists could take power in Pakistan. But there has been huge concern over Pakistan's nuclear facilities since 2004. That was when the "father of Pakistan's nuclear bomb", AQ Khan, confessed to leaking nuclear secrets to Iran, North Korea and Libya.

He received a presidential pardon and has since been under house arrest. Pakistan's government says he has revealed the full extent of his activities.

Estimates of the number of weapons Pakistan has vary from 40 to more than 100 warheads.
Once upon a time, the received wisdom was that Pakistan needed three bombs, to attack Delhi, Mumbai and Calcutta in neighbouring nuclear rival, India.
Dr Hoodbhoy Pakistan's Nuclear Expert says more weapons means more people having access to the weapons facilities.
But he believes the actual weapons are safe.

"As far as the weapons themselves are concerned, I don't believe they can be obtained by fundamentalist groups like al-Qaeda.
"The days of smuggling centrifuges out of Kahuta [Pakistan's main nuclear research facility] ended with AQ Khan."
Another nuclear expert, Brig Shaukat Qadir, agrees on that point.
"Pakistan's nuclear weapons are only as much at risk as those of the US or India," he says.

"There are differing layers of security and everyone is checked and double checked while entering and leaving the facility."
US assistance
According to Brig Qadir, even highly trained troops would find it almost impossible to storm Pakistan's nuclear facilities.
President Musharraf pardoned AQ Khan
"In the first place there is the secrecy surrounding the actual weapons storage and development facilities," he says.

"For example, while everybody talks about Kahuta, it is no longer the main facility."
Then, he says, the way the nuclear facilities were built makes penetration nearly impossible. Facilities like Kahuta are built hundreds of feet underground.
Dr Hoodbhoy agrees that Pakistan has taken steps to increase the safety of its nuclear weapons. These include sending personnel who guard the facilities for training in the US.

He believes that even small amounts of enriched uranium or plutonium could not be smuggled out of Pakistan's nuclear facilities.
"You need about 25kg to make a device the size of [that used at] Hiroshima, "Acquiring so much quantity of fissile material is not easy".
Brig Qadir said: "Everybody understands the fissile material is the main component... do you really think it will be as readily available as that?

"Both the weapons and the fissile material are accorded the same level of security. The material, therefore has the same chance of being stolen as the weapons."
Issues for US Congress
Members of US Congress have also expressed concerns regarding the security of Pakistan's nuclear weapons and related material. Senator Richard Lugar has spoken out in favor of using the cooperative threat reduction tools in Pakistan to help with the security of nuclear, biological, and chemical materials and weapons in the country.101

Additionally, a number of pieces of legislation appear designed to influence Islamabad's policies
regarding the Khan network. Section 2 of H.R. 1463, which was introduced March 12, 2009, and
referred to the House Foreign Affairs Committee the same day, states that U.S. military assistance may be provided to Pakistan only if the President certifies that Islamabad is both making A.Q. Khan available to the United States for questioning and "providing adequate assurances to the United States Government that it will monitor Khan's movements and activities in such a manner as to prevent his participation in any efforts to disseminate nuclear technology or know-how."

This section allows the President to waive restrictions on U.S. assistance imposed pursuant to the
proposed legislation if the President "certifies to Congress that it is in the national interests of the
United States to do so."H.R. 2481, the United States-Pakistan Security and Stability Act, which was introduced May 19, 2009, and referred the same day to the House Foreign Affairs Committee, the House Armed Services Committee, and the House Intelligence Committee, would require the President to "develop and transmit to the appropriate congressional committees a comprehensive interagency strategy and implementation plan for long-term security and stability in Pakistan." The strategy is to include a "description of how United States assistance" authorized by the bill "will be used to achieve the objectives of United States policy toward Pakistan," one of which is "to empower and enable" Islamabad to "maintain robust command and control over its nuclear weapons technology." The bill would authorize foreign assistance for Pakistan, including funds for improving the government's counter-insurgency capability.

H.R. 1886, the Pakistan Enduring Assistance and Cooperation Enhancement Act of 2009, would
authorize U.S. assistance to Pakistan for a variety of purposes. These include strengthening
democratic institutions and law enforcement, as well as supporting economic development,
education, human rights, and heath care. The bill would also authorize additional U.S. security

assistance for Islamabad. However, Section 206 of the bill places conditions on some of this
assistance; it states that no U.S. military assistance shall be provided to Pakistan if the President
has not made a series of determinations, one of which is that the government "is continuing to
cooperate with the United States in efforts to dismantle supplier networks relating to the

acquisition of nuclear weapons related materials, including, as necessary, providing access to
Pakistani nationals associated with such networks." The section includes a national security
waiver. The bill also requires a report to Congress that includes a "description of Pakistan's
efforts to prevent proliferation of nuclear-related material and expertise" and an "assessment of

whether assistance provided to Pakistan pursuant to this Act has directly or indirectly aided the
expansion of Pakistan's nuclear weapons program." The committee report underlines continuing
concerns about getting full information about the activities of the Khan network and development of Pakistan's own nuclear arsenal:
Pakistan's history of nuclear development and Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan's establishment of a

nuclear proliferation network remain a source for concern to many in the United States,
particularly since the Committee understands that representatives of the United States have
not interviewed certain individuals involved in the network. The Committee believes the
United States should continue to engage the Government of Pakistan on the network, and
should, as necessary, obtain direct access to the individuals covered by this subsection,

including Dr. Khan. The Committee also maintains strong concerns regarding recent reports
of Pakistan expansion of its nuclear arsenal. Given the expanding threat of Pakistan's
domestic insurgency, the Government of Pakistan's further development of nuclear materials
appears inconsistent with its immediate security threats and is unhelpful in the context of

efforts to strengthen U.S.-Pakistani relations.
H.R. 1886 was introduced April 2, 2009, and referred the same day to both the House Foreign
Affairs Committee and Rules Committee. The Foreign Affairs Committee reported the bill May
22, and the Rules Committee discharged it the same day. The bill was referred to the House
Armed Services Committee May 22 and discharged June 2. On June 11, the House passed H.R.

1886, which was appended to H.R. 2410, the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years
2010 and 2011. H.R. 2410 has been received by the Senate and referred to the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee.
The Senate passed the Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act of 2009 (S. 962) unanimously on
June 24, 2009. This bill would provide aid to Pakistan but does not include conditions regarding

the nuclear nonproliferation or nuclear weapo